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Leapfrogging manufacturing?  
5ZDQGD¶VDWWHPSWWREXLOGDVHUYLFHV-led µdevelopmental state¶ 
 
Pritish Behuria (University of Manchester) 
Tom Goodfellow (University of Sheffield) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A key characteristic of East Asian µGHYHORSPHQWDO VWDWHV¶ was a strategic focus on 
manufacturing, but developing countries today face more complex decisions about whether to 
prioritise manufacturing or attempt to µOHDSIURJ¶ straight to services. Rwanda is a striking 
example of a country that both resembles a developmental state and employs a service-led 
strategy. However, we argue that unlike the Asian developmental states, Rwanda is not 
experiencing an integrated process of transformation that ties human development together with 
economic growth. Instead, there are two parallel trajectories within the services sector: a growth 
story OLQNHGWRLQYHVWPHQWLQµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHV(such as tourism, finance and real estate) and a 
KXPDQGHYHORSPHQWVWRU\OLQNHGWRµEDVLF¶VHUYLFHVVXFKDVKHDOWKDQGHGXFDWLRQwith limited 
linkages between the two. This mismatch between growth sectors and the labour force raises 
questions about the sustainability of services-led approaches and their ability to emulate the 
East Asian experience. 
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Introduction 
 
Aspiring developmental states today are not only distinguished by their new 
geography but by varying approaches to structural transformation, and specifically the 
extent to which manufacturing lies at the heart of their developments strategies. The 
classical developmental state literature, which focused on Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan, charted successful state-driven paths to structural transformation through 
manufacturing industry (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). However, it is 
less clear to developmentally-oriented regimes in low-income countries today that 
manufacturing constitutes a desirable ± or feasible ± way ahead. The rise of Asian 
manufacturing, global value chains, global finance and new resource discoveries 
present a different range of possibilities and constraints. 
In this context, ideas of services-led development have grown in significance. 
Service sectors have been prioritized in many developing countries for a variety of 
reasons, including deindustrialization (Dasgupta and Singh, 2007; Rodrik, 2016), the 
hostile attitude of donor community to industrial policy (Rodrik, 2008) and the 
diminished policy space resulting from World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and 
other bilateral and multilateral trade treaties (Wade, 2003). The ideDRIµOHDSIURJJLQJ¶
manufacturing holds particular appeal in countries that are landlocked and face high 
import and export costs, making it harder to compete with existing low-wage 
manufacturing economies.  
Despite this, evidence and opinion are divided on whether prioritizing services 
over manufacturing is viable for sustained developmental progress. Some scholars 
KDYHDUJXHGWKDWGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶FRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHVWRGD\µFDQMXVWDV
HDVLO\EHLQVHUYLFHVDVLQPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶*KDQLand 2¶&RQQHOO, 2014, p. 3), and that 
DµWKLUGLQGXVWULDOUHYROXWLRQOHGE\VHUYLFHV¶LELG, p. 2) is underway. Against this is 
the fact that historical experiences of successful developmental transformation 
without industrialization are lacking (Chang, 2002), outside of a few states heavily 
endowed with valuable natural resources. Moreover, recent research has shown that 
manufacturing still has XQLTXHµJURZWKHQJLQH¶IHDWXUHV (Szirmai and Verspagen, 
2015), and that manufacturing is as important as ever globally (Haraguchi et al, 
2017).  
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In this paper, we contribute to these debates in two important ways. First, by 
offering a detailed case study of the experience of one country (Rwanda) charting a 
service-driven path to development. Existing research on the prospects for services-
led development tends to focus on the cross-country level, seeking to identify general 
trends, despite the fact that the prospects for success in services relative to 
manufacturing are known to be highly context-specific (Eichengreen and Gupta, 
2011; Haraguchi et al, 2017). This must be rectified if we are to understand how 
service-led strategies relate to context. 
Second, we use the Rwanda case to explore the challenges arising from 
services-based development strategies and the degree to which they are able to 
achieve the kinds of economic and societal transformation associated with the 
manufacturing-led developmental states of East Asia. While much academic analysis 
of the developmental state paradigm focuses on issues such as bureaucratic autonomy 
and the relationship between state and market, a relatively underexplored (but crucial) 
aspect of the East Asian experience was the manner in which labour was integrated 
into development strategies. As we argue in this paper, services-based development 
strategies sit uncomfortably with this aspect of the paradigm, because of the type of 
skills and level of education required among the population to ensure that services-led 
growth can be combined with broad-based, sustainable job creation.    
 Rwanda is an especially suitable case study in which to explore the 
relationship between the developmental state paradigm and a services-led approach. 
Both the structural conditions and aspects of the institutional context in Rwanda are 
reminiscent of the East Asian developmental states. However, the Rwandan 
government has chosen services rather than manufacturing as the key driver of 
transformation away from an agrarian economy. In this paper, we focus on two 
clusters of international services sectors, which, alongside tourism, have become 
important in Rwanda and other aspiring service-led developers: Meetings, Incentives, 
Conferences and Events (MICE), and Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE).  
Our analysis is based on qualitative interviews with a wide range of key informants 
conducted by both authors over a six-year period between 2011 and 2017.1 During 
WKLVSHULRGVHUYLFHVHFWRUVKDYHEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\YLVLEOHHOHPHQWVRI5ZDQGD¶V
development strategy. This is especially evident through attempts to develop Kigali 
into a business hub through the construction of the Kigali Convention Centre and 
more recently, through new tourism initiatives such as 9LVLW5ZDQGD¶VPLOOLRQ
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sleeve-sponsorship investment in Arsenal F.C. Interest in manufacturing has recently 
been revived (Behuria, 2017), but services contribute a larger share of growth and are 
growing at a much faster rate.  
7KHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHRQ5ZDQGD¶VVHUYLFH-led approach is mainly 
econometric and uncritical in its approach to this strategy (Spray and Wolf 2016; 
Uwitonze and Heshmati, 2016; Ggombe and Newfarmer, 2017). In contrast, we argue 
that the emphasis on services, which has a clear rationale in the context of land-
lockedness, donor pressures and limited natural resources, has contributed to 
economic growth but done little for equality and internal economic integration, and 
remaLQVVRPHZKDWGLVORFDWHGIURP5ZDQGD¶VODERXUPDUNHWFRQWH[W.  Rwanda has 
made significant investments in human capital (Lavers, 2016; Williams, 2017; 
Chemouni, 2018), and made some accompanying gains in social indicators; yet we 
argue that unlike in the classical developmental states, these processes are relatively 
disconnected from its economic growth trajectory.  
Thus, the Rwandan narrative of growth and poverty reduction is underpinned 
by two distinct parallel trajectories, in contrast to the highly integrated trajectory of 
the East Asian developmental states. Part of this, we argue, relates to the focus on 
services because of the difficulty of generating the necessary skills and linkages to 
generate mass employment in the kinds of service sectors Rwanda prioritizes. This 
lack of integration has not been adequately acknowledged in research thus far, partly 
because it is also obscured by the way that µVHUYLFHV¶VHFWRUV lump together extremely 
diverse forms of activity. A closer look at services, which recognises that economic 
JURZWKLQµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHVVXFKDV0,&(DQG),5(GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\EXLOGRQ
SDUDOOHOGHYHORSPHQWVLQµEDVLF¶VHUYLFHVVXFKDVHGXFDWLRQDQGKHDOWKUHYHDOVWKH
PDUNHGGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ5ZDQGD¶VWUDMHFWRU\DQGWKH(DVWAsian model. Rather 
than the development of human capital IRUPLQJDµSURGXFWLYLVW¶EDVHIRUEURDGHU
economic development, there is a mismatch between capital and labour skills, and a 
lack of attention to domestic linkages in the economy. Consequently, the structural 
transformation RI5ZDQGD¶VHFRQRP\rests on fragile foundations. 
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Services-led development and the rise of MICE and FIRE 
 
7KHHYROYLQJGHEDWHRQµGHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWHV¶ and the role of services 
 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) coined the term µdevelopmental state¶ in his study of 
-DSDQ¶V0LQLVWU\RI7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\0,7,DQGLWVVWUDWHJLFLQWHUYHQWLRQVWR
promote industrialization. The seminal works of Alice Amsden (1989) and Robert 
Wade (1990) on Korea and Taiwan followed. By the end of the century, a 
developmental state paradigm had emerged, though with significant differences in 
emphasis between key authors.2 As mainstream development policy shifted towards 
policy alleviation in the 1990s, some developmental state theorists such as Evans 
(2014a) responded by beginning to incorporate human-centred approaches, in line 
with the ideas developed by Amartya Sen (1999). Other scholars were highly critical 
of this shift, which emphasized health and education services but did little to promote 
the production-side of development or job creation (Amsden, 2012). This split 
partially overlaps with a divide between arguments that continue to emphasize the 
FHQWUDOLW\RIPDQXIDFWXULQJDQGWKRVHWKDWSULRULWL]HVHUYLFHVZLWK(YDQV¶a) 
idea of µcapability-enhancing developmental states¶ in the latter category. In his 
recent contributions to the debate KHDUJXHVWKDWµWhe new centrality of services forces 
DQ\VWDWHWKDWZDQWVWREH³GHYHORSPHQWDO´WRIRFXVPRUHLQWHQVHO\RQSHRSOHDQG
their skills, instead of machines and their owners.¶(YDQV, 2014b, p. 43).  
This dispute obscures the extent to which the successful developmental states 
focused on the link between µSHRSOHDQGWKHLUVNLOOV¶DQGµPDFKLQHVDQGWKHLURZQHUV¶
in other words, between labour and capital. Linking these two is especially hard in 
internationally-competitive service sectors as it is challenging to construct a 
comparative advantage in the requisite forms of labour. This raises questions about 
the extent to which a focus on such sectors FDQSURYLGHWKHµSRWHQWLDOIRUUDSLG
WHFKQRORJLFDOSURJUHVVDQGODERXUSURGXFWLYLW\JURZWK¶ (gQLú, 1991, p. 112), 
something that was central to the strategic selection of priority sectors in countries 
such as South Korea. In support of their drive to industrialize, the East Asian 
GHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWHVDOOHPSOR\HGYDU\LQJIRUPVRIµSURGXFWLYLVW¶VRFLDOSROLF\
whereby labour was suppressed politically but the provision of education, healthcare 
and welfare were targeted towards the µproductive sectors¶ of society (Mkandawire, 
2007, p. 25). Social rights were thus initially extended only to industrial workers in 
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South Korea (Holliday, 2000), DQGµDJJUHVVLYHSURDFWLYHPDQSRZHUGHYHORSPHQW
strategies based on medium to long term vision of RFFXSDWLRQDOVNLOOUHTXLUHPHQWV¶
were adopted in several cases (Bennell and Segerstrom, 1998, p. 286). Meanwhile, in 
Japan and Korea, resources mobilized through pensions funds were channeled directly 
into industrialization, further driving a virtuous circle of social investment and 
industrialization. 
As a consequence of these strategies, the architecture of social policy was 
µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDO¶, serving to integrate labour into specific industrial development 
strategies (Mkandawire, 2007).  These often-overlooked aspects of the East Asian 
experience were crucial for the rapid evolution of industrial productivity. They helped 
to generate high-yield ODERXUWKDWZDVµDEOHWRUHVNLOOLWVHOIGXULQJWKHSURFHVVRI
LQGXVWULDOXSJUDGLQJ¶&DVWHOOV, 1992, p. 53) and not only transformed the economy 
EXWµFRPSOHWHO\FKDQJHGWKHVRFLHW\¶LELG, p. 66).  
The highly skilled and specialized nature of work in many service sectors 
poses challenges for creating the requisite forms and quality of labour, particularly for 
highly globalized international services sectors. Incentives set by external interests are 
partly to blame for this. In 1986, the World Bank argued that the social returns for 
higher education were lower compared to those of pre-primary education ± an 
arguPHQWZKLFKODLGWKHIRXQGDWLRQIRUµXQLYHUVLW\EDVKLQJ¶IURPRWKHUGRQRUVDQG
1*2VLQ$IULFD0NDQGDZLUHS'RQRUV¶REVHVVLRQZLWKTXDQWLWDWLYH
measures including enrolment and construction of classrooms to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their investments in education has also led to obscuring a focus on the 
quality of education ± as Williams (2017) has shown in Rwanda. Thus, perhaps 
ironically, the attempt to create services-led developmental states faces particular 
challenges because of the grHDWHUGLIILFXOW\LQXVLQJµEDVLF¶VHUYLFHVVXFKDV
healthcare, education provision and forms of social protection) to generate an 
DSSURSULDWHODERXUIRUFHIRUµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHVVXFKDVILQDQFH,&7VWRXULVPDQG
real estate). 
 
The state of evidence on services-led development  
 
The classical pattern of structural change, theorized through the experience of 
industrialized countries, begins with the reduction of the share of output and 
employment in the agriculture sector and its transfer to the manufacturing sector, and 
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later (in some advanced countries) to the services sector (Clark, 1940; Chenery, 
1960). Though it could be argued that China has followed this model, IndiD¶VGHFOLQH
in agriculture has been accompanied by some increase in industry but a much larger 
increase in services, which has been interpreted as a response to changes in the global 
economy (Nayyar, 2013). These two paths of structural change have had varied 
impacts on the relationship between capital and employment in these countries.  
Most African countries have seen a similar trend to India, involving substantial 
growth in the services sector even without the saturation of manufacturing demand. 
As of 2015, services contributed to almost half of Africa¶VWRWDORXWSXWDQGDERXW one-
third of formal employment (UNCTAD, 2015). The increasing prominence of 
services has been accompanied by optimism about services-led growth. Much has 
been made of how information technology has permanently changed central 
characteristics of the world economy, with the rise of a network society (Castells, 
2010). Arguing against traditional Kaldorian (1967) perspectives, which favoured the 
central position of manufacturing in economic transformation, some now argue that 
services µare leading to the expansion of manufacturing, rather than the other way 
around¶ (Dasgupta and Singh, 2005, p. 1055). Clearly, some services ± like finance ± 
are essential components of economic transformation and growth. However, in 
WRGD\¶VPRUHLQWHJUDWHGZRUOGDQG with the increasing prominence of global value 
chains, services that facilitate coordination, administration and transportation are 
considered strategically important (Kaplinsky and Morris, p. 2016).3  
 *KDQLDQG2¶&RQQHOO argue that not only do services comprise an 
increasing component of GDP as countries become richer, but in the contemporary 
global economy, they create more jobs at earlier stages of development than 
manufacturing and demonstrate faster productivity growth. However, this positive 
DVVHVVPHQWRIVHUYLFHVDVDµQHZERDWWKDWODWHFRPHUVFDQWDNH¶UHOLHVRQDEURDGDQG
unspecified definition of services, with little consideration either of the informal 
economy or the nature of the jobs created. Crucially, the kinds of services that are 
driving growth and prioritized in policy are often very different from those in which 
jobs are being created. As has been argued elsewhere, cities in developing countries 
tend to exhibit a persistent disconnect between capital and labour (Schindler, 2017), 
which is partly a function of low degrees of industrialization.  
 Although services such as IT and finance can in theory play the µescalator role 
that manufacturing has traditionally played¶, such services sectors are highly skill-
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intensive and cannot absorb the type of labour that exists in low- and middle-income 
countries (Rodrik, 2016, p. 29). Other services are either not very dynamic 
technologically or are non-tradable. How exactly µEDVLF¶services such as education 
and health provision fit into ideas of service-led growth is also contested. These are 
usually seen as social goods that help build the human capital to spur growth in other 
sectors, but they also comprise significant growth sectors in some developing 
countries, particularly where international aid plays a substantial role in growing 
activity within these sectors. This underscores how diverse the serYLFHµVHFWRU¶UHDOO\
is, and the complexity of the stories of µVHUYLFHVHFWRUJURZWK¶ 
Moreover, there DUHLPSRUWDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQµILUVWZDYH¶VHUYLFH growth 
at relatively low-income levels, which tends to mostly comprise µWUDGLWLRQDO¶VHUYLFHV
(such as lodging, meal preparation, housecleaning, beauty and barber shops), and 
µVHFRQGZDYH¶VHUYLFHJURZWK, which LQFOXGHVµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHVVXFKDVILQDQFLDO
ICT, legal, advertising and business services (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2011). Some 
developing countries have EHQHILWWHGIURPµVHFRQGZDYH¶VHUYLFHJURZWKmuch more 
than others. Another report (UNECA, 2015) argues that since most services are non-
tradable, countries reliant on their services sector for economic growth will eventually 
struggle with trade balance constraints.  
a) The role of MICE and FIRE 
Notwithstanding these ongoing debates, service sectors have become central 
both to growth trajectories and development strategy in many countries. Tourism in 
particular has become integral to economic strategies in many developing countries. 
International organizations like the United Nations World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO) and academic scholarship (Wearing et al, 2005) have argued that the 
sector has potential for poverty alleviation. It also provides obvious benefits for 
developing countries in dire need of foreign exchange. However, a large portion of 
tourism scholarship has remained critical of the seFWRU¶VGHYHORSPHQWDOLPSDFWV
(Harrison, 2001). Despite the opportunities that tourism provides, small countries are 
invariably forced to develop strategies that leave them highly dependent on foreign 
capital and vulnerable to the perceptions of outsiders. 
 MICE has been an increasingly important component of growth of global 
tourism (Mistilis and Dwyer, 1999). It refers to business tourism dedicated to 
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planning and facilitating conferences, seminars, meetings, exhibitions or similar 
events. The strategic appeal of MICE is that it potentially links together multiple 
service sectors in a mutually supportive way, including tourism and hospitality, 
education, financial services, transport and logistics, and real estate development. 
MICE also boosts the construction sector, and is thought to have broader benefits in 
technology acquisition, knowledge exchange and the forging of business connections 
(Kumar et al, 2014). 
MICE has become a component of economic strategies in several countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region (UNWTO, 2012). Some developmental benefits have been 
recognized; for example, in the Philippines, MICE visitors spend an average of six 
times as much in the country as regular tourists (Francisco et al, 2017, p. 6). Although 
MICE provides foreign exchange and facilitates associated infrastructure, prioritizing 
it does little to accommodate low-skilled employment and, like tourism, success is 
highly dependent on foreign capital and perceptions. There is also evidence that 
international MICE tourists are unlikely to spend much time ± or money ± outside 
µJDWHZD\¶FLWLHVlimiting distributional benefits (Mistilis and Dwyer, 1999).  
A further group of services sectors can be categorized under the banner of 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE). The study of the relationship between 
economic growth and the development of finance and insurance is beset with 
problems of reverse causality and contested data. It has been argued that financial 
development is not only pro-growth but pro-poor (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). 
However, one recent study of 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa found that µthere is 
still very limited support for the hypothesis that financial development leads 
economic growth in SSA countries¶ (Menyah et al, 2014, p. 393). Significantly, 
financial sector growth has been preceded by the liberalization of the financial sector 
in most African countries. In comparison, no East Asian developmental state 
relinquished control of their financial sectors prior to achieving significant structural 
change (Wade, 1990). The situation is equally contested with regard to insurance, 
with one meta-analysis of 85 studies finding only very patchy evidence on causal 
relationships (Outreville, 2013).  
Real estate, the final component of FIRE, is a booming sector in many 
developing countries, often fuelled in part by aid, diaspora finance, high inflation 
rates and the lack of productive manufacturing sectors (Obeng-Odoom, 2010; 
Goodfellow, 2017a). This supports jobs in the construction industry and can 
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encourage foreign investment. However, data from China suggests a much stronger 
causal relationship from GDP growth to real estate development rather than the other 
way around (Shen and Liu, 2004). Evidence from OECD countries also suggests that 
FDI in real estate does little for economic growth (Gholipour et al, 2014).  Growth 
aside, the developmental benefits of real estate development are not clear. While new 
models of state-led and market-driven forms of housing investment are unfolding 
across Africa, the former are often used for clientelistic purposes to reward supporters 
while the latter rarely provide for the poor, and most real estate development is 
untaxed (Croese, 2017; Goodfellow 2017b; Pitcher, 2017). 
More broadly, growth in FIRE sectors does not generally translate into a 
proportional increase in employment. In the US, for example, the percentage of GDP 
generated in the FIRE sectors increased by 34.2% between 1979 and 2005, yet the 
percentage of the population working in those sectors increased only 10.6% over the 
same period (Palley, 2013). For over half a century, scholars have argued that this 
VKLIWIURPWKHµUHDO¶HFRQRP\WRWKHILQDQFHHFRQRP\FDQFRQWULEXWHWRHFRQRPLF
vulnerability (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). Overall, while there are obvious reasons why 
many developing countries prioritise MICE and FIRE today, these are mostly 
negative ones: i.e. their structural weaknesses and the difficulty of constructing 
comparative advantage in manufacturing, rather than clear evidence that MICE and 
FIRE will deliver developmental benefits.  
 
 
5ZDQGD¶V6HUYLFHV-led Development Strategy 
 
 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led government has overseen 5ZDQGD¶V
economic recovery since the genocide, despite widespread criticism of its record on 
human rights and political freedoms (Reyntjens, 2013). Rwanda has enjoyed annual 
GDP growth of more than 6% most years since 1994. Though agriculture and industry 
have both experienced some growth, services sectors have been growing the fastest. 
The composition of Rwandan GDP shows signs of some transformation, with the 
main element of that being a shift from agriculture towards services (Figure 1). The 
share of services has increased from 29% in 1994 to over 47% in 2015, while industry 
has reduced from 21% in 1994 to about 14% in 2015.  
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Source: World Bank  
 
 Figure 2 demonstrates that service sectors have had very healthy growth over 
the past 15 years, particularly trade and retail, finance, ICT and tourism. The primacy 
of such sectors was explicitly highlighted LQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW
strategy ± Rwanda Vision 2020, developed in 2000 ± demonstrating its eagerness to 
gamble on developing a knowledge-based economy (GoR, 2000). Services were seen 
DVEHFRPLQJµWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWHQJLQHRI5ZDQGD¶VHFRQRP\¶ (GoR, 2000, p. 7). 
The developmental niche that the country aimed for was µservices, communication 
and financial sectors¶p. 16) WREHFRPHDµKXE¶DWWKHµ*DWHZD\EHWZHHQ(DVWDQG
&HQWUDO$IULFD¶p. 7). 
In the more recent Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper II (EDPRS 2), there are some shifts in emphasis. While these include some 
DWWHQWLRQWRµOLJKWPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶WKLVLVOLVWHGDORQJVLGHRWKHUµHPHUJLQJVHFWRUV¶
including business tourism, financial services and Business Process Outsourcing 
(BPO).  Overall, the emphasis RQµPRGHUQ¶ service sectors is still dominant, with the 
word µPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶DSSHDULQJMXVWWLPHVLQWKH-page document relative to 33 
for tourism and 33 for financial services/financial sector (MINECOFIN, 2013).  
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Figure 1: Composition of Gross Domestic Product in Rwanda: 
1994-2015
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) Industry, value added (% of GDP)
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)
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Source: MINECOFIN 
 
 
Recent literature has emphasized WKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIVHUYLFHVLQ5ZDQGD¶V
recent development trajectory (Uwitonze and Heshmati, 2016; Ggombe and 
Newfarmer, 2017). This literature also highlights some key differences between 
5ZDQGD¶VH[SHULHQFHDQG the more µERWWRP-XS¶ service-led growth in some major 
emerging economies. In India, for example, the advance of the service sector has been 
attributed primarily to the expansion of health and education in the population (Latha 
and Shanmugam, 2014). In contrast, services growth in Rwanda has been driven by 
public investment (Ggombe and Newfarmer, 2017) and factors such as increased 
access to finance, training personnel, new ICT applications and the tax system: in 
other words, it is a much more state-driven process (Uwitonze and Heshmati, 2016). 
Government officials explicitly state that prioritizing services was as a result 
of their own domestic technical constraints (including transport costs and limited 
domestic market).4 Transforming Kigali into an international µKXE¶RIYDULRXVNLQGV ± 
transport, financial, tourism and information technology ± was seen as integral to link 
Rwanda to the fastest-growing sectors of the global economy. Tourism has become an 
increasingly important source of foreign exchange; by 2015, it had become the single 
largest export sector, accounting for 29% of all exports (IGC, 2016). In 2014, the 
government received US $342m from tourism receipts (Bishumba, 2016). 
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There can be little doubt that the Rwandan government has worked 
particularly hard to grow its tourism industry. They invested in the construction of 
what is now the Serena Hotel (against donor advice), hoping it would work as a 
µGHPRQVWUDWLRQHIIHFW¶WREULQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOKRWHOVWRWKHFRXQWU\%HKXULD
The government has also heavily invested in the national airline (Rwandair), the 
Kigali Convention Centre and in conservation attempts of Virunga National Park and 
other tourist destinations within the country. The Rwandan government took the 
decision to prioritise the tourism sector as part following advice from donors and 
consultancy groups, with a National Tourism Strategy developed in 2001 
(Mazimhaka, 2007). Supporting gorilla tourism ± KLVWRULFDOO\5ZDQGD¶VPRVW
significant tourist attraction ± was central to the strategy. The dependence of tourism 
revenues on gorilla tourism increased from 75% in the early 1990s to 93% 
(Mazimhaka, 2007). Of the 800 mountain gorillas residing in the world, 440 are in 
Rwanda, with 216 born since 2005 (Tashobya, 2016). 
 The government acknowledges that gorilla tourism µis our main attraction¶,5 
and in line with leveraging growing international interest gradually increased the cost 
of a permit for foreign visitors from US $250 in the early 2000s to US $750 in 2013. 
Over 20,000 people visited the VNP in 2014, more than three times the number that 
visited in 2003. Building on the apparent willingness of foreign visitors to pay high 
prices, in 2017, the government doubled cost of a permit from US $750 to US $1500. 
Operators and consultants argued that this insistence on high prices relative to 
neighbouring Uganda and DRC ZDVSDUWRIµDQREVHVVLRQZLWKKLJK-HQGWRXULVWV¶
which neglected the other kinds of opportunities available.6 However, the 2017 
decision also demonstrates efforts to build Rwanda into a broader tourism and MICE 
destination: a 30% discount applies for visitors who visit other national parks in 
Rwanda for at least 3 days, and a 15% discount for those who stay µpre and post 
MICE events¶ to see the gorillas.7  
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Source: Rwanda Development Board (RDB) 
 
This reflects a broader aim became WRµJREH\RQGJRULOODV¶DQGHVWDEOLVK
Rwanda as more than an add-on destination at the end of a tour of East Africa (GoR, 
2009). Emphasis was placed on attracting µhigh-end international tourists¶ and by 
2010, RDB officials were impressed with the increases of visitors for national parks 
and began to see MICE as a priority area for further support,8 including through 
improving customer service in hotels and restaurants and expanding air travel 
facilities.9 Currently, the average visitor to Rwanda spends only 3.2 days in the 
country, and it is seen as crucial to try and raise this to a week or more (IGC, 2016, p. 
25). In pursuit of this, Rwanda sharpened its focus on the key sectors needed for its 
MICE ambitions to succeed. In the following section, we examine how the 
government has built the MICE sector and how this has been supported by a 
concurrent focus on FIRE.  
 
MICE on FIRE 
 
Chasing MICE 
 
The Rwanda Convention Bureau (RCB) was launched by the government in 
2014. Rick Taylor, CEO of the Business Tourism Company that helped to set up the 
RCB, argued that the µpropeller¶ to deliver the 5ZDQGDQJRYHUQPHQW¶VYLVLRQRI 
becoming the first middle-income country in Africa µis categorically, the MICE 
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sector.¶10 The government claimed success in the few years after RCB was created, 
announcing that MICE revenues were projected to triple from US $49m in 2013 to 
$150m by 2017.11 In the same period, the government was also working feverishly to 
complete the physical centrepiece and symbol of its MICE strategy: the Kigali 
Convention Centre (KCC). The project was initiated in 2007 by three corporate 
investors ± Rwanda Investment Group, Prime Holdings and the Rwanda Social 
Security Board (RSSB). Initially slated for completion in 2011, it was beleaguered by 
controversy, escalating costs and terminated construction contracts, and only finally 
opened in June 2016. Expectations on the Convention Centre were piled high: a 
government official argued that it was a µJDPHFKDQJHUIRU5ZDQGD¶VGHYHORSPHQW¶, 
while a private consultant characterized it as µ5ZDQGD¶VYHUVLRQRIWKH(LIIHO7RZHU
7KDW¶VKRZLPSRUWDQWLWLV¶12 With construction costs of over $300m, the KCC is now 
the most expensive building complex in Africa. The KCC comprises a 5-star Radisson 
Blu hotel, a 2,600-capacity conference centre, Kigali Information Technology Park 
and a museum on the bottom floor.  
The effort and expenditure to facilitate MICE activities have been reflected in 
increasing numbers of high profile events. In 2016, Rwanda hosted over 40 
international conferences, including high profile events such as the World Economic 
Forum, Global African Investment Summit and the AU Summit. Consequently, 
Rwanda was ranked joint third in the International Congress and Convention 
Association (ICCA) 2016 business tourism rankings for the continent, after South 
Africa and Morocco. 7KLVDFWXDOO\H[FHHGVWKH5&%¶VRZQDPELWLRQVZKLFKZHUHWR
rise into the top 10 by 2016, up from 21st in 2014. Kigali itself is now placed 
third DPRQJWKHFRQWLQHQW¶VWRSFLWLHVIRUPHetings, conventions and events ± above 
Durban and Johannesburg. In 2016, Kigali hosted the same number of major meetings 
as Mumbai, Basel, Philadelphia and Nanjing (ICCA, 2016).  
By the end of 2016, Kigali had 3,400 upper- and middle-range hotel rooms 
available.13 Hotels had been another major focus of the government since 2007, both 
in the capital and beyond.14 One businessman recounted how the President invested 
his own money in regional investment groups to persuade local businessmen to invest 
in hotels in regional towns.15 In Kigali, a prominent local businessman who 
previously served in the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) during the liberation effort 
led investment in the first Marriott hotel in sub-Saharan Africa outside of Cape Town. 
This was a further landmark for the MICE sector, containing 18 conference rooms. 
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Alongside the various major investments in hotels, Rwandair ± WKHFRXQWU\¶VQDWLRQDO
airline ±significantly expanded its fleet, providing infrastructural support to the MICE 
industry. The government owns 99% of Rwandair, which began operations in 2002 
and now operates routes to over 20 cities within and outside Africa. Rwandair is yet 
to make a profit, but government officials argue that it is integral to promoting Kigali 
as a services hub in Africa.16 
In addition, the Rwanda Association for Professional Conference Organizers 
(RAPCO) was established to develop an accreditation system for professional 
conference organizers. This, it is hoped, will build on the positive reputation Rwanda 
enjoys with large shares of the global business community, HYLGHQFHGE\5ZDQGD¶V
2015 UDQNLQJLQWKH:RUOG%DQN¶V'RLQJ%XVLQHVVLQGH[DV the third-best country to 
conduct business in Africa, as well as third-least corrupt country in Africa by the 
Global Corruption Perception Index (Rwirahira, 2017).  Criticisms of the Rwandan 
government from within academia (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson, 2013) have not 
GDPDJHGWKHFRXQWU\¶VUHSXWDWLRQDPRQJ the global business community, providing a 
further boon to the MICE strategy. 
 
 
a) Sparking the FIRE  
 
FIRE sectors are natural counterparts to MICE, particularly given the major, 
capital-intensive infrastructure and real estate requirements for MICE activities.17 
Financial liberalization rapidly gathered pace in the 2000s, as a number of foreign 
banks bought shares in struggling Rwandan commercial banks and new commercial 
banks from Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda entered the market (Behuria and Goodfellow, 
2016). In 2017, there were 13 commercial banks in the sector. The government only 
retains a majority share in the largest bank ± Bank of Kigali (BK) ± which enjoys 
30% of the financial sector in most indices including assets, deposits and labilities. 
'HVSLWH%.¶VLQIOXHQFHCommercial bank representatives themselves commented on 
their surprise that the government eagerly liberalized finance before µRwanda can 
stand on its own two feet.¶18 As the liberalised financial sector expands to include 
more citizens, the loan books of commercial banks have developed a concentration 
that reflects an emphasis on MICE and FIRE. In 2016, construction, hotels, commerce 
and transport accounted for more than 85% RI%.¶VORDQERRNCommercial bankers¶
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loan books had a similar composition, and some were worried about this 
FRQFHQWUDWLRQKLJKOLJKWLQJWKDWLWZDVµDWLFNLQJWLPHERPE¶DQGµXQVXVWDLQDEOHLQWKH
long-UXQ¶19  
Simultaneously, the government has put significant effort into developing the real 
estate sector, with a strong focus on Kigali, and ± as with the tourism sector ± a strong 
IRFXVRQWKHµKLJKHQG¶7KLVLQFOXGHVPRVWVSHFWDFXODUO\WKHµ9LVLRQ&LW\¶SURMHFW
the first phase of which comprises 504 variable-sized units that retail at prices ranging 
from US $370,000 to $560,000.20 When complete, the project aims to accommodate 
over 22,000 people, and is reputedly the largest real estate project in East Africa.21 
This project is funded by the RSSB, which has been pivotal in the expansion of MICE 
and FIRE since it holds 40-50% of liquidity in the financial sector and its investments 
are largely concentrated in real estate, hotels and construction.22 Also investing in real 
estate are domestic party-owned enterprises such as CVL Developers (the real estate 
arm of party-owned conglomerate, Crystal Ventures), Kenyan firms such as Fusion 
Capital and some domestic private investors.  
There has also been a rapid increase in mortgage provision in recent years. Up to 
70% of the loans made by some banks are now in the form of mortgages.23 There is 
concern about the sustainability of this model in the Rwandan context; some bankers 
have allegedly µgrown wary of bricks and mortar.¶24 Interest rates of around 17% 
combine with the costs of landlockedness, and the removal of construction incentives 
in 2013, to render construction very expensive in Rwanda. A 2017 report from the 
consultancy firm Turner & Townsend (2017), found construction in Kigali to be more 
expensive per square metre than in Johannesburg, Kampala, Dar es Salaam and 
Nairobi. At $1117 per square metre, WKHFRVWLVDSSURDFKLQJWZLFHWKDWRI1DLUREL¶V
$683 (ibid). This makes building for the mass market very difficult, and a handful of 
real estate developers in Kigali are all µfighting for 20% of the market¶, with very 
little provision for the majority. There is increasing evidence of oversupply at the high 
end, with rents starting to dip significantly from around 2014, despite a chronic 
housing shortage. The significant growth in construction and real estate thus conceals 
growing concerns about a bubble in the process of bursting (Goodfellow, 2017a).  
These recent developments reflect the fragility of 5ZDQGD¶VVHUYLFHV-led 
development strategy. The success of MICE and FIRE depend significantly oQµJRLQJ
ELJ¶; in other words, capturing high-end, luxury international markets. Even beyond 
WKHVHFWRUDOIRFXVLWVHOI5ZDQGD¶VDSSURDFKGLIIHUVVLJQLILFDQWO\IURPWKHFODVVLFDO
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developmental state approach in ways that are intrinsically linked to its decision to 
focus on international services. These include the liberalization of finance and the 
outward-facing role of the RDB, which acts primarily as a hub for investors to polish 
5ZDQGD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLPDJHUDWKHUWKDQDQRGDODJHQF\stimulating innovation and 
participating directly in industry (Behuria, 2018). As we explore below, this services-
driven strategy also involves significant differences in the capital-labour relationship, 
with implications for the potential for transformation of the kind achieved by Asian 
developmental states.  
 
Parallel development trajectories and missing linkages 
 
 
While they undeniably played a role in economic growth, the contribution of 
service sectors such as MICE and FIRE to employment and internal economic 
integration have been much more ambiguous. 7KHµEODFNER[¶RIVHUYLFHVFRQFHDOV
this to some extent: because services have increased substantially as a share of both 
GDP and employment, it looks as though a virtuous circle is at play. However, a 
closer analysis reveals gaps and vulnerabilities, raising questions about the 
sustainability of the approach. It is helpful here to distinguish broadly between three 
types of service sectors (building on the existing literature)µEDVLFVHUYLFHV¶VXFKDV
health, education, and forms oIVRFLDOSURWHFWLRQµWUDGLWLRQDOVHUYLFHV¶VXFKDVVPDOO-
scale provision of low value-DGGHGVHUYLFHVLQWKHLQIRUPDOHFRQRP\DQGµPRGHUQ¶
services, such as those discussed above. Rwanda has seen substantial investment-
fuelled economic growth in the latter, alongside largely aid-funded progress in the 
first category (Chemouni 2018; Williams 2018). It has also experienced what we 
might characterize as ordinary, expected growth in the middle category, which tends 
to swell in the context of urbanisation. However, the lack of an integrated 
development trajectory linking the three into a process of deeper structural 
transformation is clear from a closer qualitative analysis of what lies the statistics. 
 
For example, it is still µWUDGLWLRQDO¶VHUYLFH activities such as wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, and transportation and storage that 
comprise the majority of establishments and employment in the services sector (NISR 
2017). Similar to many other developing countries, these are the kinds of activities 
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that swell the numbers of people working in services. They are also sectors in which 
the vast majority of workers ± 93-DFFRUGLQJWRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRZQGDWD
(NISR, 2017, p. 136) ± work in the informal sector, with little connection to the MICE 
and FIRE strategy. There is therefore a gulf between service sectors that employ large 
numbers of people and those that are leading economic growth. When it comes to 
contribution to GDP, the MICE and FIRE sectors loom large: real estate, for example, 
comprised almost 8% of GDP in 2017 ± more than the entire manufacturing sector at 
6% - but employs a mere 0.1% of the population (BNR, 2018; NISR, 2017; p. 136). 
Finance comprised around 3% of GDP in 2017 (four times the amount in 1999); yet 
finance and insurance combined employ only 0.4% of the population (ibid) and just 
RIWKHSHRSOHZRUNLQJLQµVHUYLFHV¶ (BNR, 2018).  
2QRQHOHYHOLWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWWKHµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHVVHFWRUVHPSOR\
relatively few people, and the increase in output from these sectors relative to 
HPSOR\PHQWLVRIWHQFHOHEUDWHGDVµLQFUHDVHVLQSURGXFWLYLW\¶GULYHQby a sectoral shift 
out of agriculture and towards services (e.g. Ggombe and Newfarmer, 2017). 
However, the fact that these are capital rather than labour-intensive sectors can be 
VHHQDVKLJKO\SUREOHPDWLFLQWKHFRQWH[WRI5ZDQGD¶VGHPRJUDSKLFVKLIW- with the 
working age population projected to increase from 6.7 million in 2014 to 16 million in 
2050 (World Bank 2016) ± and contrasts VWDUNO\ZLWKWKHµGHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWH¶
experience. The fact that in finance and insurance, for example, 75% of people are 
formally employed and 53% have a university degree only underlines the gulf 
between these people DQGWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKRVHZRUNLQJLQµVHUYLFHV¶± a gulf that 
Rwanda is finding extremely difficult to bridge.  
Tourism provides an interesting example. In 2016, it contributed 
approximately 74,000 jobs, adding 123,000 jobs indirectly.25 However, despite the 
IDFWWKDWRIDOOWKHµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHVHFWRUV, it has been the most successful in creating 
jobs, the sector retains DQµDFXWHJDSRIVNLOOHGKXPDQUHVRXUFHV¶ (Mastercard 
Foundation, 2016). Attempts to provide skills training for the tourism sector have 
lagged behind the needs of the sector. The government established Rwanda Tourism 
University College (RTUC) in 2006, and the Akilah Institute for Women in 2010, but 
such initiatives are very small in scale and have not provided the requisite skills at the 
pace needed to match the growth of tourism investments. Foreigners dominate senior 
and managerial roles in the sector, with one manager of a five-star hotel in Kigali 
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noting that µtourism gives some employment but we also have to compete for jobs 
with Kenyans and Ugandans. Most of the managers are also Kenyan.¶26  
 The skills deficit is especially acute in the hotel and hospitality sub-sector, as 
well as in sub-sectors such as passenger air transport (RDB, 2012a). Additionally, 
50% of staff were thought to need language training in key international languages 
including English, French and Chinese (RDB, 2012a, p. 70). Other basic skills were 
seen as lacking: in the words of one tourism operator, µGraduates from RTUC know 
KRZWRIROGDQDSNLQEXWWKH\GRQ¶WDFWXDOO\NQRZDQ\WKLQJDERXWWRXULVPRU
service.¶27 In general, there is an emphasis on certification rather than developing the 
problem-solving, project management, entrepreneurial and team management skills 
needed by managerial staff (MasterCard Foundation, 2016). 
Similar problems can be observed in other MICE and FIRE sectors. In 
financial services, a bank official noted that µour biggest problem has been human 
resources¶, due to a lack of skilled financial experts who can be hired µat the right 
price.¶ The tendency therefore is to hire foreigners, usually from elsewhere in the East 
Africa region because µit is hard to hire Rwandese.¶28 Meanwhile, there are fears of a 
brain drain because Rwandans returning home with international Masters degrees are 
often unable to find suitable work, and end up in µlowly jobs¶ such as cleaning.29 
Paradoxically, qualified Rwandans therefore often find themselves applying for jobs 
elsewhere, while firms resort to hiring foreign staff to get the specific expertise they 
need. This disjuncture suggests a mismatch between the skills being acquired by 
educated Rwandese and the sectoral demands generated by new investment.  
Construction firms echoed the view that it is µa huge drain on resources to hire 
locals.¶30 The skills shortage in this sector, which is usually considered within 
µLQGXVWU\¶EXW underpins both MICE and FIRE, is particularly acute, amounting to 
65% of the existing labor force. Despite increasing demand for professional 
construction services, µthe number of students taking construction courses and 
graduating from universities is dismal. In the last two years, less than 130 
professionals have graduated in this field.¶ (RDB 2012b, p. 78). This represents a 
clear missed opportunity to link labour to the booming sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, in this sector especially, there is controversy around employment due to 
the role of Chinese investors and contractors. A common perception was that Chinese 
firms µbring in hundreds and sometimes thousands of Chinese workers¶, partly 
because µthe construction manuals are all in Chinese¶,31 and that µthe skills transfer 
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MXVWLVQ¶WKDSSHQLQJ\HW¶32 Chinese construction firms contest these narratives, 
arguing that one Chinese supervisor will oversee as many as 30 local staff, and that 
they are committed to building local capacity.33 The Rwandan government itself has 
always taken the attitude that µwe can buy capacity while building our own.¶34 
However, in the relatively liberalized MICE and FIRE sectors, the extent to which 
µbuying capacity¶ and building it are mutually compatible is questionable: without 
adequate training or skill transfer, the buying-in of capacity could undermine building 
it at home. 
Some systemic impacts of MICE on internal economic integration may also be 
undermining its growth benefits. Despite claims that job creation in major 
international hotels like the Serena generates multiple additional jobs in wider society 
(MasterCard Foundation, 2016), there are significant drawbacks to the proliferation of 
high-end hotels. Some are now over-supplied and damage mid-tier hotels that were 
µalready operating at or below 50% capacity utilization [«] below the break-even 
point for many¶ (IGC, 2016, p. 25). Between 2013 and 2015, at least 100 hotels were 
put up for sale after owners failed to repay their loans (Gahigi, 2015). The 
JRYHUQPHQW¶Vhotel strategy does not currently match the demand of visitors, aside 
from the brief duration of occasional international conferences. Even long-standing 
hotels such as Mille Collines were only around 30% full most of the time in 2015.35  
Other concerns relate to the extent to which robust backward linkages are 
being developed in the construction of hotels and other MICE and FIRE projects. The 
MICE strategy is characterized by a reliance on foreign investors for large-scale 
investment, alongside some strategic use of state- or party-owned enterprises and a 
handful of domestic entrepreneurs. There is some evidence that these firms enter 
partnerships with smaller local firms, for example in terms of inputs into the 
construction sector.36 However, in the rush to feed the construction boom, many 
Rwandese actors claim that the government eagerly hands contracts over to foreign 
firms without sufficient attention to integrating the domestic economy. In the words 
of the CEO of one Rwandan firm: 
 
µ5ZDQGDLVWKHRQO\FRXQWU\,NQRZZKHUH\RXFDQMXVWVLWRQ\RXUFRPSXWHULQ&KLQD
DQGELGIRUVRPHWKLQJDQGZLQLW«HYHQLQ.HQ\D, you would have to have local 
FRQWHQWSURYHWKDWZKDW\RXZHUHSODQQLQJWRGRFDQ¶WEHGRQHE\ORFDOVZe need to 
start shifting in this direction.¶37 
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Many large foreign firms are not registering with the relevant professional 
body in Rwanda ± the Private Sector Federation (PSF) ± in a way that enables 
linkages, knowledge exchange and skills transfer to occur. There is therefore no 
mechanism to ensure large foreign firms share their learning and skills. This was 
corroborated by interviews with foreign firms; one representative of a Chinese firm 
was not even aware of the PSF and had never been approached to join it.38 
This raises broader issues about linkages in the MICE and FIRE sectors and 
whether these are being cultivated ± including between MICE, manufacturing and 
agriculture, which have greater unskilled job creation potential. In 2008, OTF argued 
that Rwanda must develop µstronger bonds between large hotels or ³anchor firms´ 
and local SME providers, such that goods and staff are sourced locally.¶39 However, 
some small firms suggested the government was too focused on identifying strategic 
priority sectors and did not help entrepreneurs develop linkages, for example by 
encouraging the manufacture of goods to feed into MICE sectors.40  
Given these problems, LWLVTXHVWLRQDEOHZKHWKHU5ZDQGD¶VEROGDWWHPSWWR
push a services-led strategy through a developmental state approach can generate the 
kinds of structural and societal transformation associated with the East Asian 
experience. The combination of low wages with rapid increases in productivity was 
crucial in East Asia and was supported by productivist social policies that channeled 
welfare and human development directly towards economic goals. This is harder to 
achieve with services like MICE and FIRE. People with the requisite skills are few 
and demand high wages, with international staff filling many of the gaps. Unlike in 
Taiwan, where the proliferation of highly localized small industries provided 
opportunities for low-skilled and low-wage factory work that could then be 
progressively up-skilled and up-scaled as the economy developed, Rwanda is 
attempting to leap into high-end, high-skilled activities.  
None of this is to say that Rwanda has not invested substantially in human 
capital formation ± it clearly has. It can even be argued that its approach to social 
SURWHFWLRQSURJUDPPHKDVµSURGXFWLYLVW¶HOHPHQWVLQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWJRHVEH\RQG
basic poverty-reduction goals to support a broader development agenda, as Lavers 
(2016) has shown. However, the function of social protection beyond poverty 
alleviation in Rwanda is more about promoting community self-reliance and securing 
government legitimacy than creating a productive workforce for specific sectors 
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(ibid). Meanwhile, advances in healthcare such as the community-based health 
insurance remain heavily donor-dependent, pursuing an elusive goal of universal 
basic coverage (Chemouni 2018) with little link to a productivist agenda. Even clearer 
in support of our argument is the case of education. Williams (2017) has shown how 
performance-based incentives led to progress in education in terms of quantitative 
measures like construction of classrooms and enrolment, but the quality of education 
and its capacity to produce a skilled workforce was very poor.  Thus school-leavers 
ILQGWKHPVHOYHVµLQFOXGHGLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWSURMHFWYLV-à-vis the 
education system while simultaneously excluded from meaningful opportunity given 
WKHSRRUTXDOLW\RIWKDWV\VWHP¶LELGThe trajectories of human development 
and economic growth in Rwanda are therefore largely progressing along separate, 
parallel tracks rather than being progressively intertwined and mutually supporting 
each other as was the case in East Asia. 
 
Conclusion: prospects for a services-led developmental state 
 
Rwanda is attracting attention as an aspiring services-led developmental state 
with a rapidly growing tourism sector, and success in MICE and FIRE sectors. 
Though the government has directed this services-driven approach through state-led 
strategies reminiscent of developmental states and achieved substantial growth, its 
priority has been to develop links outwards with global finance and engage with the 
international business community. Less attention has been paid to the needs of 
businesses, the role of labour and the potential for creating domestic economic 
linkages.  
The Rwandan experience raises important questions about how a focus on 
high-end services is facilitating internal integration, technology acquisition and skills 
transfer. These issues are often overlooked in the literature on services-led versus 
manufacturing-led development, which is largely concerned with short-term growth 
effects.  7KHIRFXVRQµJRLQJELJ¶DFURVVDUDQJHRILQWHUOLQNHGVHUYLFHVVHFWRUVLQ
Rwanda has a certain logic. But one of the key difficulties in pursuing this approach is 
that international service sectors have increasingly globalized standards and 
processes, which Rwandan training institutes are not yet seen to be providing. Time is 
also a significant constraint given that the rapid growth of MICE and FIRE sectors 
have left little time for local Rwandans to acquire the skills necessary for quality 
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employment in those sectors. Thus, even where there is substantial job creation 
resulting from investments in these sectors, many jobs are not filled by Rwandans.  
These problems are likely to be faced by any country seeking to specialize in 
µPRGHUQ¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVIURPDSRVLWLRQRIORZOHYHOVRIKXPDQGHYHORSPHQW
and are particularly worrying for those with large and growing youth populations. The 
dynamism and highly globalized nature of these sectors means that trying to catch the 
µERDW¶UHTXLUHVUDSLGIRFXVHGDQGWDUJHWHGLQYHVWPHQWnot only in terms of capital but 
also in labour. This is much harder to do than in the context of manufacturing 
industry, which creates more low-skilled than high-skilled jobs. What is likely to 
happen in the case of µPRGHUQ¶ services is the creation of relatively few high-skilled 
jobs and even fewer low-skilled ones. Parallel efforts to provide education and social 
protection for the majority cannot easily bridge the gap either by creating lower-
skilled jobs or generating the requisite skills to fill the few high-skilled ones.  
Rather than producing an East Asian-style outcome, these parallel trajectories 
are likely to produce volatile growth coupled with significant inequality and a reliance 
RQWKDWRWKHUJURXSRIµVHUYLFHV¶: traditional precarious labour associated with work in 
the informal economy. A services-driven development route necessarily involves a 
fundamentally different trajectory from the classical developmental states. Services-
driven development can potentially VXFFHHGEXWWKHUHLVQRDXWRPDWLFµWULFNOH-GRZQ¶
IURPµPRGHUQ¶VHUYLFHJURZWK. Any broader development depends on continuous 
redistributive policies, which will probably need heavy support through continued aid. 
The Rwandan government has belatedly realized that a better balance between 
services and manufacturing is required. However, any country hoping to emulate the 
µGHYHORSPHQWDOVWDWHV¶has to work hard to innovate in building the linkages between 
manufacturing and services, and between both of these and its labour force. 
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 For a detailed review of the literature on services growth in developing countries, see 
Balchin et al. (2016). 
                                                        
 31 
                                                                                                                                                              
4
 Interview, Rwanda Development Board, May 2013; Interview, Office of the President, 
January 2015 
5
 Interview, RDB official, January 2012.  
6
 Interview, consultant, January 2015; Interview, tour operator, May 2012. 
7
 Volcanoes National Park website: http://www.volcanoesnationalparkrwanda.com/trip-
planner/gorilla-permits.html. Accessed 18 July 2017. 
8
 Interview, RDB official, November 2011. 
9
 Internal consultancy report. 
10
 http://www.internationalmeetingsreview.com/rwanda/rwanda-steps-outreach-mice-
business-98995. Accessed 18 July 2017. 
11
 Interview, RDB, May 2013. 
12
 Interview, MINICOM, August 2016; Interview, Rwandan consultant, August 2016. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Interview, RDB, February 2012. 
15
 Interview, local businessman, May 2012. 
16
 Interview, MINICOM, March 2012. 
17
 We do not discuss the insurance sector in Rwanda in detail, both for reasons of space and 
because it is considered to be performing relatively poorly and lagging behind other service 
sectors (http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/208402/, accessed 18 July 2017). 
18
 Interview, foreign bank official, January 2015.  
19
 Interviews, commercial banks, June 2017. 
20
 Documents obtained from Ultimate Developers, June 2014. 
21
 Interview with foreign construction firm A, January 2015. 
22
 Interviews, commercial banks and government representative, August 2016 and June 2017. 
23
 Interview with banking official, January 2015 
24
 http://www.africapropertynews.com/east-africa/3249-property-bubble-looms-in-
rwanda.html, accessed 18 July 2017. 
25
 Internal consultancy report. 
 32 
                                                                                                                                                              
26
 Interview, hotel manager, March 2012. 
27
 Tour operator quoted in MasterCard Foundation 2016: 16.  
28
 Interview with banking official, January 2015 
29
 Interview with international consultant, January 2015. 
30
 Interview with foreign construction firm B, January 2015 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Interview with foreign construction firm B, January 2015 
33
 Interview with foreign construction firm A, January 2015 
34
 Interview with senior government minister, December 2009. 
35
 Conversation with member staff, Hotel de Mille Collines, January 2015. 
36
 Interview with construction firm Project Manager, January 2015.   
37
 Interview with Director of a domestic firm, January 2015. 
38
 Interview with Chinese firm representative, January 2015. 
39
 Internal consultancy report. 
40
 Interview with entrepreneur, January 2015. 
